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PROTECTING USERS OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Margaret Ryznar*
Social media platforms started as a fun way to connect with friends and family.
Since then, they have become a science fiction nightmare due to their capacity to
gather and misuse the data on their users.1
For example, in early 2018, a whistleblower revealed that major election and
referendum votes were influenced by “psychological warfare” on Facebook users
through data obtained by Cambridge Analytica.2 A few years before this, Facebook
admitted to running a psychological experiment on its users that may have altered
their moods to see whether “emotional contagion” could be spread.3 Meanwhile, in
2014, the free online dating website OkCupid acknowledged that it intentionally
© 2019 Margaret Ryznar. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as
each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and
includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University McKinney School of Law. Thanks to Carolyn Kelly
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1 “One well-recognized threat” to privacy that arises from the conversion of our social
interactions into data “is from the robust concentrations of electronic information aggregated into
colossal databases.” Woodrow Hartzog, Social Data, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 995, 995 (2013). However,
other issues arise from social media use. For example, Facebook has led to many divorces because
it alerts spouses to infidelity in addition to providing proof of it for court. See, e.g., Shane Witnov,
Investigating Facebook: The Ethics of Using Social Networking Websites in Legal Investigations,
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 32 (2011) (noting that a majority of
matrimonial lawyers have used evidence from social networks).
2 See, e.g., Carole Cadwalladr, “I Made Steve Bannon’s Psychological Warfare Tool”: Meet
the
Data
War
Whistleblower,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
18,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wyliefaceook-nix-bannon-trump. A Cambridge University academic allegedly developed an app that
pulled the Facebook data of fifty million people without their consent when their Facebook friend
used the app. Id. Facebook acknowledged that it allowed the Cambridge researcher in cognitive
and behavioral neuroscience to obtain the data with user permission, but the app did so without the
consent of millions of users. Id. Then, a political intelligence firm built psychological profiles on
people who would be targeted with certain messaging to influence them in, for example, the 2016
U.S. presidential election and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom. Id. “Research suggests that
social media data and information about a user’s website choices can be used to determine a user’s
personality.” Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 1369, 1403 (2017).
3 See Calli Schroeder, Note, Why Can’t We Be Friends? A Proposal for Universal Ethical
Standards in Human Subject Research, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 409, 410–11 (2016).
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made incompatible matches for research purposes.4 Even without such meddling,
online dating can lead to lawsuits.5
It is not irrational for social media providers to seek to capitalize on their data
when they provide the platforms for free. 6 Indeed, their business model is to sell
data to third parties for marketing and other purposes. 7 Yet, users should be able to
expect that their data is not used to hurt them or is not sent to disreputable companies.
Indeed, fewer people would use social media if the price were incurring a mood
disorder or being manipulated to vote in a particular way. 8
While technology continues to push the boundaries of law as it evolves,
effective legal protection has not evolved with it. 9 As evidenced by recent events,
the field of privacy has failed social media users. 10 Meanwhile, the field of
cybersecurity arose to address cybercrime, but many of the questionable uses of

4 James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users, 13
COLO. TECH. L.J. 219, 223–24 (2015) (summarizing some of the experiments conducted on
unknowing social media users).
5 See, e.g., Phyllis Coleman, Online Dating: When “Mr. (or Ms.) Right” Turns Out All
Wrong, Sue the Service!, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 139, 157–58 (2011).
6 Yet, social media companies do not correct misperceptions regarding this. “Companies
often summarize their data privacy policy as a series of services for the user’s benefit without
making clear what value the company is getting from the consumer’s personal information.”
Lauren Henry, Note, Institutionally Appropriate Approaches to Privacy: Striking a Balance
Between Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Privacy Law, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 193, 194
(2014).
7 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting
Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 62–63 (2013); see also Katheryn A. Andresen, Marketing
Through Social Networks: Business Considerations—From Brand to Privacy, 38 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 290, 293–94 (2011) (explaining the business model of social networking websites).
8 “I’d feel betrayed to find out that a company that purports to be a conduit to help me find
others’ content turned out to be shaping my experience according to its political agenda.” Jonathan
Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 337 (2014).
9 “In 1986, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act (‘SCA’) to provide additional
protections for individuals’ private communications content held in electronic storage by third
parties. . . . Yet, because Congress crafted the SCA with language specific to the technology of
1986, courts today have struggled to apply the SCA consistently with regard to similar private
content sent using different technologies.” Christopher J. Borchert et al., Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy Settings: Social Media and the Stored Communications Act, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
36, 36 (2015).
10 Privacy as a concept is complicated, evading definitions and standards. See Ira S.
Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and
Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1333, 1333 (2013) (noting regulators’
reliance on “‘privacy by design’ as a critical element of their ongoing revision of current privacy
laws. . . . But [Fair Information Practices] are not self-executing.”); Derek S. Witte, Bleeding Data
in a Pool of Sharks: The Anathema of Privacy in a World of Digital Sharing and Electronic
Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 717, 723 (2013) (noting, for example, the FTC’s past decision to make
social media companies have a privacy policy, but not imposing any content for that policy). See
generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).
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social media data were legal. The legality of these problematic actions has received
criticism and prompted calls for change.11
There are several choices lawmakers and policymakers have when it comes to
the protection of social media data from exploitation by social media companies.
Among these are fiduciary duties in corporate and trust law, as well as the duty of
care in tort law.12 However, can these centuries-old legal frameworks grasp the risks
and consequences of the improper use of big data generated by social media, or must
they be tweaked?
This Essay examines the benefits and drawbacks of fiduciary duties and the
duty of care frameworks in the context of social media. Any framework must hold
data holders responsible for data breaches while fitting their business model.
I.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Fiduciary duties are a package of obligations imposed on those entrusted with
the interests of others, often in regard to financial holdings in the fields of corporate
law and trust law.13 The two main fiduciary duties are the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care.14 The duty of care essentially requires the fiduciary to pursue the
interests of the other party to the fiduciary relationship, whereas the duty of loyalty
basically demands that the conduct of the fiduciary be free from conflict and selfdealing.15 A fiduciary may also owe subsidiary duties, such as duties of good faith.16

11 “As technological innovation accelerates, so does the need to recalibrate individual
expectations, social norms, and, ultimately, laws and regulations.” Tene & Polonetsky, supra note
7, at 73. “Consumers, companies, and policymakers increasingly think about collection and control
of personal information, and the media prominently highlights these issues.” Nicole A. Ozer,
Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social Movement and Creating Corporate
Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 215 (2012).
12 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 710 (2018).
Other legislative choices include heightened Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements when
academic researchers are involved in particular or implementing a “right to be forgotten” like the
European Union. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to
Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 353 (2015); Lauren
B. Solberg, Note, Data Mining on Facebook: A Free Space for Researchers or an IRB Nightmare?,
2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 311, 312. Another possibility is a citizen-suit provision in relevant
legislation, coupled with a prohibition on mandatory binding arbitration. This would help level the
playing field between individual users and a massive, wealthy corporation that controls huge flows
of information and valuable social networks. Knowing that regular users can sue might also provide
an incentive for social media companies to police themselves. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield &
Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 385 (2015) (noting that people’s
attitude toward their own privacy impacts others, making privacy a public good).
13 See generally ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
588 (10th ed. 2017).
14 Andrew D. Appleby & Matthew D. Montaigne, Three’s Company: Stone v. Ritter and the
Improper Characterization of Good Faith in the Fiduciary Duty “Triad,” 62 ARK. L. REV. 431,
431 (2009).
15 See id. at 432.
16 See id. at 431.
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Fiduciary duties have traditionally involved a financial relationship between
the parties,17 but this does not prevent their application to social media companies.
Users generate data, which is valuable because marketers routinely purchase it to
better target their advertisements.18 Trust is a significant factor in people’s
willingness to share personal information on online social networks. 19 Thus, the
fiduciary duty model may be applicable.20
There are several reasons to apply a fiduciary duty framework to social media.
Fiduciary duties have few exceptions, making them strong protectors of users.
When engaged in self-dealing, for example, the fiduciary in trust law is subject to a
no-further-inquiry principle—good faith and fairness to the beneficiaries are not a
defense.21 This would also prevent social media companies from abrogating these
duties in their contracts with users,22 thus barring Facebook from contractually
requiring its users to weaken the company’s duties of loyalty and care. This is
important given the contractual nature of the relationship between users and social
media companies.23
One useful feature of this framework is its subset of subsidiary duties, such as
the duty for social media platforms to do due diligence on companies buying or
otherwise seeking the big data generated by social media users. 24 For example,
Facebook would have to explore the background of companies seeking its data with
the intention of preventing the Cambridge Analytica scenario.25 Another relevant
and important fiduciary duty is to delegate work with the data only to reasonable
parties, carefully selecting, instructing, and monitoring them. 26 Finally, the duty of
prudence in trust law requires a degree of care, skill, and caution. 27 These fiduciary
17 See id. at 440 (discussing the traditional context of a fiduciary duty arising between a
shareholder and the director of that same corporation).
18 See Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation,
or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 447 (2011) (noting that websites, network
advertisers, data brokers, secondary users, and the government all use data on individuals).
19 Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 193, 193 (2016).
20 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 74, 122
n.245 (2018) (“Many scholars, including Daniel Solove, Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, Danielle
Citron, and others, have recommended a shift toward a fiduciary or trustee model to ensure
corporations take consumer privacy seriously. Notably, scholars suggested that changes to law on
the books would be necessary before any such fiduciary relationship took hold.”).
21 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 13, at 599.
22 See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1179 (2009) (noting
users will not negotiate enough privacy with the social media company in many circumstances).
23 See, e.g., In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 841 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
24 As of 2017, there are over 455,000 Tweets per minute and three million posts shared per
minute on Facebook—and these numbers are growing. Jeff Schultz, How Much Data Is Created
on the Internet Each Day?, MICRO FOCUS BLOG (Oct. 10, 2017), https://blog.microfocus.com/howmuch-data-is-created-on-the-internet-each-day/.
25 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
26 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 13, at 658–60.
27 Specifically, a trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by
considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the
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duties would slow the involvement of bad actors seeking big data from social media
platforms.
However, there are drawbacks to imposing fiduciary duties on social media
structures. Among these are the number of duties and the strictness of the standard,
which may be ill fitted to impose on a voluntary, nonfinancial relationship. For
example, the conflict of interest that social media companies have with user data is
practically inherent to their business model, possibly leading to the distortion of the
fiduciary duty standard. Fiduciary duties may simply be too inflexible for the social
media context. These concerns are less prevalent in the duty of care in tort law.
II.

DUTY OF CARE

The duty of care is a legal obligation that a party act toward another as a
reasonable person in the circumstances would. 28 In a tort case, if the actions do not
meet the standard of care, then the actor may be liable for any injuries caused. 29
The duty of care between two parties depends on their relationship. For
example, product manufacturers have a duty to consumers to make safe products,
property owners have a duty to visitors to protect them, and business directors have
a duty to shareholders to make reasonable decisions in the best interests of the
business.30
However, courts have been hesitant to establish a duty of care owed by data
aggregators to consumers who are not the customers.31 Indeed, “[w]hen consumers
seek to enforce a breached duty of care claim, courts struggle to coherently establish
when and between whom the duty existed.”32 Two recent cases reflect the courts’
hesitancy:
In Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., the court held that a payment processor
owed no duty to consumers using the company’s platform to send funds to
merchants. Similarly, in In re Zappos.com, Inc., the court declined to treat a
company statement about the security policy as an enforceable contract and also
33
denied the existence of an implied contract to safeguard the data.

If the courts continue to find no duty of care in the social media context,
legislators may decide to introduce a statute that imposes such a duty. 34 For

trust. Id. at 624. This can be translated to the social media context by requiring social media
companies to manage user data with prudence.
28 See David W. Barnes & Rosemary McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to
Take Corrective Precautions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 357, 379 (1994).
29 See id.
30 See, e.g., id. at 386.
31 Matthew Hector, Do We Really Have No Place to Hide?, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 57, 64 (2005) (reviewing ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO
HIDE (2005)).
32 Merritt Baer & Chinmayi Sharma, Does Equifax Owe Victims a Duty of Care?, LAWFARE
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-equifax-owe-victims-duty-care.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (considering the role of courts
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example, a duty of care has been codified in statutes like the Data Protection Act in
the United Kingdom.35 Effective legislation must delineate what is encompassed in
the duty of care because social media companies can exploit vague language.
Congress can also assign a federal agency such as the Federal Communications
Commission some responsibility for oversight and development of more detailed
regulations, but clear statutory language is necessary to guard against regulatory
capture.
Applying the duty of care to the social media context accepts social media’s
function to collect and profit on people’s data. Social media users do not produce
confidential information—they produce big data. In contrast, for example, a lawyer
representing a client must use reasonable care to avoid inadvertent disclosure of
confidential information.36
Thus, the duty of care can acknowledge the business model of firms in big data,
while requiring that they vet the companies with which they interact. It continues to
incentivize Facebook and other social media companies to engage in exchanging
free services with users for data, while limiting the possibility of data compromise.
This would avoid giving user data to companies like Cambridge Analytica, but
would not harm Facebook’s relationships with established businesses like Sephora. 37
While it is difficult to determine which actions would breach the duty of care,
perhaps at least “novel, unexpected use of existing information” can be
discouraged.38
Given the social media model, it may be that the duty of care is more
appropriate than fiduciary duties. This would justify the application of the duty of
care from tort law to the modern-day problem of data protection in social media.
CONCLUSION
The current framework for protecting users of social media does not work.
Modern cybersecurity laws do not apply to the social media model of sharing or
selling user data. In contrast, both the centuries-old fiduciary duties and the duty of
care in tort law offer ways to protect the data of social media. They provide remedies
to social media users by allowing them to sue the social media company that failed
to uphold the duty owed, which would influence the way social media companies
use their data and self-police. The adaptability of ancient common-law doctrine to
modern dilemmas could thus save social medial users a lot of grief, undue influence,
and harm.

versus legislatures in protecting threats to privacy by technology in the Fourth Amendment
context).
35 Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29 (UK).
36 JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAW AND LIABILITY § 5:9 (2d ed. 2018).
37 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
38 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 7, at 68. “Limited public awareness about these practices
has contributed to a regulatory environment in which the aggregation and brokering of personal
data has largely gone unchecked.” Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix
of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 65 (2017).

